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Abstract 
Fault analysis of man-in-loop systems is a valuable issue worthy of being studied, 
especially in projects including high risk and high investment like manned space 
missions. Spacecraft sometimes must have the fault tolerance to complete their task 
even after errors occurring. Inverse simulation was previously proved to achieve 
manually rendezvous and docking (RVD) successfully. The aim of this paper is to 
demonstrate the potential applications of inverse simulation to undertake the thruster 
fault analysis and reconfigurations in manned RVD mission. Firstly, the inverse 
simulation system is established in a model predicted control structure. Then, the 
astronauts’ operational strategy is analyzed through the thruster fault simulation, and 
an operational rate factor is proposed to assess the failure risk. In addition, the original 
configuration is transformed to strengthen the resistance under consideration of the 
fault tolerance. The comparative results indicate that the modified configuration can 
improve the performance effectively and then guarantee the success of the mission.  
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Nomenclature 
acha acceleration vector of chaser m/s2 
atar acceleration vector of target m/s2 
af  components of acha - atar in Hill coordinate system; m/s2 
x, y, z  relative positions m 
Rtar  distance vector between the target and the earth center m 
μ gravity constant  
ωtar angular velocity of the target orbit rad/s 
 (t, t0) state transforming matrix  
u (t, t0) input transforming matrix  
=t simulation time step t-t0 s 
Cbh transform matrix from body coordinate system to Hill coordinate 
system 
 
Ctb  transform matrix from measurement coordinate system to body 
coordinate system 
 
az  azimuth rad 
el elevation rad 
,, roll angle, yaw angle, pitch angle rad 
I rotational inertia matrix kg.m2 
M external moment vector N.m 
ω relative angular velocity vector rad/s 
xt, yt, zt target mass center coordinates in the measurement coordinate 
system 
m 
xs, ys, zs measurement center coordinates in the Hill coordinate system m 
 slope distance of the target mass center m 
p vector from target mass center to chaser mass center m 
ps sensor installing vector m 
pt vector from the measurement center to the target mass center m 
|az |max maximum azimuth angle ° 
|el |max maximum elevation angle ° 
| |max, | |max maximum attitude error ° 
|y*|, |z*| maximum offset m 
̇௦, ̇௟. border parameters of the switching lines rad/s 
d, , a0 switching line parameters  
btc1, btc2, btc3 opening time parameters  
m  mass of the propellant kg 
umax  maximum thrust m/s2 
u*  outputs of the inverse simulation m/s2 
𝒙ෝ(t)  predicted state in one step  
𝒖ෝ inputs in one step (t-t0) m/s2 
  opening time in one step  s 
nt n numbers of inverse simulation step s 
kt ,kf  time sensitivity factor and acceleration sensitivity factor  
k sensitivity factor of the system  
J minimum cost function  
Q  coefficient matrix reflecting the weighs of different components of 
states 
 
Pthrust basic thruster amount  
kp operational pulse rate  
1 Introduction 
The established manually controlled rendezvous and docking (RVD) system 
considered in this paper is composed of target spacecraft, chaser spacecraft, astronauts, 
sensor, and thrusters [1]. The orbit control and attitude control are completed by 
astronauts and controllers respectively. During the rendezvous process, astronauts can 
adjust positions and velocities of the chaser according to the relative information 
obtained from various sensors systems in order to achieve the final docking [2]. 
The modeling and analysis methods of man-in-loop dynamics system can be 
classified into the analytical method [3-6] and the experimental method [7-12]. Due to 
the safety concerns of astronauts, the fault experiment cannot be conducted in the real 
environment. Thus, the combined method of the experimental and analytical method 
is introduced to study the astronauts’ operation under circumstances where there is a 
fault present.  
Inverse Simulation (IS) is a technique to determine the required control inputs 
needed to achieve specified desired response, the aim of which is to calculate the 
required inputs of certain maneuvers, for example, the stick operation of the pilots 
[13]. Inverse simulation in the helicopter design stage is called “desk top flight test” 
[14], as it can simulate some specific testing flight and obtain the pilot’s operations 
using models and some experimental data. This technique can be regarded as a 
method that combines experiment with analysis and is different from traditional 
simulation methods, in that it can acquire more flight information than open-loop or 
off-line design simulation methods [14, 15]. In the previous research, an IS has been 
proved to reproduce the astronaut’s operation successfully [16], while this paper aims 
at investigating the possibility of IS in analyzing the handling qualities in faulty 
conditions. After considering precision, efficiency, and stability of different 
algorithms [17-20], the model predictive control (MPC) [21] structured IS technique 
is chosen for the thruster fault simulation of the manually controlled RVD. Based on 
the simulation results, the operational strategy and the tolerance border of the system 
are studied and the thruster configuration is further designed. 
Considerable research activities in Spacecraft design has been concerned with 
the configuration design of thrusters. As early as 1969, Crawford [22] proposed the 
linear programming method to design the time minimum and fuel minimum 
configurations. Then, Hwang et al. [23] designed the upper loaded stage using particle 
swarm optimization to gain the biggest achievement of control commands. Wang et al. 
[24] proposed an index representing for the limitation of control ability as a design 
factor for the thruster configuration. Moreover, there are some other investigations 
about redundant online allocation [25-28] and coupling control with limited thrusters 
[29]. 
Configuration design not only includes the installing positions and orientations 
of thrusters but also the choice of the thruster type and control allocation strategy. The 
focus of this paper is the improvement of initial designed configuration in order to 
make RVD system resistant to the thruster faults. Wiktor [30] proposed the concept of 
minimum control authority and proved that the configuration is sufficient to the 
control mission when the amplitudes of the disturbing force and moment are in the 
limitation of the minimum control authority. However, there are some other cases 
when the mission is still controllable with the disturbance out of the limitation. In 
these cases, astronauts sometimes can still complete the mission by some specific 
compensations even though the disturbing force and moment caused by the fault 
thruster are beyond the minimum control authority. The manually controlled system 
has the characters of robustness, discreteness, nonlinearity, and uncertainty. 
Traditional methods using eigenvalues analysis and stability criterions are too 
complex for this system to determine the border of controllable disturbance. One 
effective way to solve this problem is to simulate directly to find the mechanism 
behind the mission failure. According to the IS results, the modified configuration can 
be proposed to improve the system resistance to the thruster fault.  
This paper describes the application of IS to the analysis of thruster configuration 
through the following structure: 
In the second section, the RVD model and attitude controller are established and 
then are integrated into RVD IS system; the third section introduces the original 
configuration and the fault modes of thrusters, and interprets the operation strategy 
and the physical workloads under both single-axis fault and multi-axis fault; in the 
fourth section，the modified configuration is proposed and verified according to fault 
simulation results; the last section concludes all the research findings of this paper. 
2 Modeling of Manually controlled RVD 
2.1 RVD dynamics and kinematics modeling 
The coordinate systems and parameters used in this paper are shown in Fig. 1. 
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Fig. 1. Coordinate systems and parameters. 
p refers to the vector from target mass center to chaser mass center. ps refers to 
the installing vector of the sensor. pt refers to the vector from the measurement center 
to the target mass center. The Hill coordinate system is defined with zh-axis orienting 
to the earth center, xh-axis orienting to the velocity, and yh-axis submitted to right 
hand regulation. All axes of body coordinate system are orienting to the body main 
axes. zr-axis of measurement coordinate system is in the same direction of yr-axis in 
body coordinate system. The directions of xr-axis and yr-axis are opposite to the 
directions of xb-axis and zb-axis, respectively. , , and  refer to the attitude 
parameters. az and el are the angles of the view. 
Without any assumptions, the relative dynamics equations [2] are given by 
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where af refers to the components of acha - atar in the Hill coordinate system; x, y, and 
z refer to the relative positions; Rtar refers to the distance vector between the target 
and the earth center; μ is the gravity constant; ωtar is the angular velocity of the target 
orbit. Given the assumptions that the earth is spherical and uniform (i.e. without 
consideration of gravity disturbance), the target travels around the near circle orbit, 
and the distance between the two spacecraft is far less than the orbit radius. Eq.(1) can 
then be simplified as 
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where u refers to the component of the control input in the Hill coordinate system. 
The above equations, according to the state function form, can be transformed into 
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where  (t, t0) is the state transforming matrix and u (t, t0) is the input transforming 
matrix, which are shown as 
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where =t=t-t0, s=sin ωtar, and c=cos ωtar. 
Assumed that the inputs are constant in , Eq.(3) can be modified into 
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The expected control input vector u* can be expressed in the Hill coordinate 
system as 
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where Cbh refers to the transform matrix from the body coordinate system to the Hill 
coordinate system. The equation can be further simplified when ignoring the second 
order small quantities as 
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The attitude dynamics equations are generally given by 
      I ω ω I ω M  (10) 
where I is the rotational inertia matrix, M is the external moment vector, and ω is the 
relative angular velocity vector. Each axis of body coordinate system is along the 
direction of principle axis of inertia. The components of kinematics equations are then 
given as 
 
1 0 sin 0
0 cos cos sin ( , , )
0 sin cos cos 0
x
y hb tar
z
C
  
        
    
      
              
            



 (11) 
The coordinates of the target mass center Oh in the measurement coordinate 
system Or -XrYrZr are set to (xt, yt, zt), and then the slope distance of the target mass 
center , azimuth az, and elevation el can be calculated from 
 t el az t el az t elcos cos , cos sin , sinx y z           (12) 
The vector from target mass center to the chaser mass center p, the installing 
vector of sensor ps, and the vector from the measurement center to the target mass 
center pt connect from end to end, i.e. p + pt + ps = 0, which is shown in Fig.1. The 
components of the above equation can be given by 
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where Ctb is the transforming matrix from measurement coordinate system to body 
coordinate system. Substitute Eq.(12) into Eq.(13) and ignore the two order small 
quantity, the relationship between measurement parameters and the relative motion 
state can then be expressed as 
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Eq.(14) can be used to determine the actual azimuth and elevation angle, which is 
shown as below 
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Fig. 2 illustrates the relationship of the sensor view and the target in the standard 
case, attitude error case and the position error case.  
 
Fig. 2. Target and sensor view relationship diagram. 
According to the maximum azimuth |az|max and elevation |el|max, and the 
maximum attitude error ||max and ||max, the maximum offset |y*| and |z*| can be 
expressed as 
 * *az elmax max max max( ) , ( )s sy y z z            (16) 
where the ranges of the attitude error ||max and ||max are pre-designed according to 
the docking requirements. Eq.(16) can be used to determine maximum lateral offsets 
and the RVD corridor is then determined. The target within the corridor stays in the 
sensor view even if the attitudes reach the maximum values. 
The attitudes are controlled by the automatic control scheme, as detailed in 
Appendix A. Meanwhile astronauts should cooperate with the automatic controller to 
keep the chaser in the limitation of the largest lateral offset. 
2.2 Inverse simulation method in RVD 
The IS method used here has a similar structure to MPC. The inverse link, the IS 
steps, and the forward simulation steps in the IS method are regarded as the predictive 
model [20]，the receding horizon, and control period in MPC, respectively. The main 
difference of outcomes between IS and MPC is whether the control outputs in one 
receding horizon are constant or not. The outputs of the inverse loop are constant, 
while MPC chooses the first control signal of the optimized sequences in every loop 
as the control input. Thus, the MPC structured IS technique retains properties of MPC 
to achieve the online and multi-variable control. At the same time, properly simplified 
an inverse model with the high-order forward model can obtain precise results and 
improve the simulation efficiency [20]. 
The structure of IS includes IS link, forward simulation link, measurement link, 
and data offered link, shown in Fig. 3.  
 
Fig. 3. Inverse simulation structure. 
In this IS structure, the internal loop is IS, and the forward simulation and 
measurement link belong to the external loop. The current state of spacecraft x(t+t) 
is produced by the external loop and transmitted to the internal loop through the 
measurement link. The expected state x(t+nt) * is produced from the experimental 
data or the designed guidance law. The term nt refers to the n numbers of IS step t. 
The desired control input u* can be calculated according to the current forward 
simulation results x(t+t) and the desired states x(t+nt) *. The continuous control 
signal is then discretized using the pulse width pulse frequency theory, as detailed in 
Appendix B. Then, the discrete control input is passed into the forward simulation 
link to start the next simulation loop. 
According to the numbers of dimensions of inputs and outputs, the control inputs 
calculation can be classified into normal, sufficient and insufficient problems 
depending on that the dimension of the input is equal, bigger or smaller than that of 
the output. To establish a general IS structure, a uniform formulation of these three 
kinds of problems is required. The state function in one step can be given by 
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where 𝒙ෝ(t) refers to the predicted value in one step. If the inputs 𝒖ෝ keep constant in 
one step (t-t0), the equation above can be expressed as 
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For the normal equations, u(k) can be calculated directly, while the sufficient and 
insufficient equations should be calculated as the follow steps. The IS is to find the 
most suitable input 𝒖ෝ to get the minimum cost function J between expected and 
predicted states, i.e. 
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where x refers to the predicted state of the input 𝒖ෝ within one receding horizon, xc 
refers to the expected state, Q refers to the coefficient matrix reflecting the weighs of 
different components of states. Eq.(19) is discretized to 
 ( ( )) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))J k n k n k n k n k      Tc cu x x Q x x  (20) 
The solution of the sufficient and insufficient equations can both be calculated to get 
the minimum of J(u(k)). According to the pseudo-inverse theory, the weighed 
minimal norm least square solution is given by 
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Verification is conducted by the independently developed 9 degrees of freedom 
manually controlled RVD experiment platform in National University of Defense 
Technology [31]. The platform utilizes the console to record all the operations and 
motion states data during the process. The experimental data can be used as the input 
of the IS, and the results are compared with recorded operational data to verify the 
established IS model [32]. 
2.3 Application of IS structure in RVD 
Same as the aircraft, during the approaching phase of RVD, the spacecraft 
sometimes need to be manually controlled to achieve some specific translational 
motion (or the rotational motion at the same time). In the manually controlled RVD 
system, astronauts are replaced by the inverse model. Given out the desired mission 
trajectories of RVD, the simulation result is then calculated using inverse simulation 
technology, shown as Fig. 3. The applications of IS on RVD system fall into two 
aspects. One application is the initial handling qualities assessment (details can be 
seen in [33]). The other application is the failure effect analysis and allocation design. 
Few research concerned about the manually controlled strategy under the failure 
circumstance and the further allocation design. The process of the allocation design 
can be illustrated in Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4. Guideline for the thruster configuration design. 
When some of the actuators broke down, the inverse model was utilized to 
control the spacecraft to move along the desired trajectory. According to the pulse 
amounts, operation strategies for astronauts to complete the mission can be concluded. 
The allocation of the thruster can then be further reconfigured against different failure 
scenarios. 
3 Failure mode and effects analysis 
3.1 Original configuration and failure modes 
The thruster used in the mission is an electromagnetic-type actuator. The coil 
current lifts the flow valve to jet the propellant [34, 35]. Failures in any link could 
cause a thrust error. The covering strategy is to shut down the detected faulty thrusters. 
Thus, the thrust fault is equally abrupt and permanent. All the faults mentioned later 
mean the thrusts descent to zero. The original arrangement is shown in Fig. 5, which 
is composed of one orbit maneuver engine; six bidirectional attitude control thrusters: 
a, a~, b, b~, c, c~; and twelve unidirectional translational control thrusters: d1, d1~, d2, 
d2~, e1, e1~, e2, e2~, f1, f1~, f2, f2~. 
 
Fig. 5. Original thruster configuration. 
The switching signal is designed according to the configuration. The logical 
relationships between switching signals and control signals are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 
 Comparison table of control signals and switching signals. 
Thruster Symbols 
x-axis Control y-axis Control z-axis Control 
0 1 -1 0 1 -1 0 1 -1 
Attitude 
Thruster 
a 0 1 -1 - - - - - - 
a~ 0 -1 1 - - - - - -- 
b - - - 0 -1 1 - - - 
b~ - - - 0 1 -1 - - - 
c - - - - - - 0 1 -1 
c~ - - - - - - 0 -1 1 
x-axis 
Orbit 
Thruster 
d1 0 1 0 - - - - - - 
d2 0 1 0 - - - - - - 
d1~ 0 0 1 - - - - - - 
d2~ 0 0 1 - - - - - - 
y-axis 
Orbit 
Thruster 
e1 - - - 0 0 1 - - - 
e2 - - - 0 0 1 - - - 
e1~ - - - 0 1 0 - - - 
e2~ - - - 0 1 0 - - - 
z-axis 
Orbit 
Thruster 
f1 - - - - - - 0 1 0 
f2 - - - - - - 0 1 0 
f1~ - - - - - - 0 0 1 
f2~ - - - - - - 0 0 1 
There are two operational states for unidirectional thruster in the table, i.e. 0 
refers to thruster closing and 1 refers to thruster opening. The attitude control thrusters 
have three operational states i.e. -1 refers to the negative direction opening, 1 refers to 
the positive direction opening, and 0 refers to thruster closing. The opening signal of 
each thruster is determined once the configuration and the control signal are defined. 
This paper considers the faults in the orbit control thrusters as it relates to the 
astronaut’s operation directly. When all the thrusters in any axis are broken down, the 
chaser must run in the passive or active modes to avoid flying into the forbidden zone 
[36-38]. The other faulty cases when the astronauts can still achieve the docking with 
the remaining thrusters are mainly discussed here. The error modes can be separated 
into single-axis error, multi-axis error based on the axis or into one thruster error, two 
thrusters error and so on based on the numbers of faulty thrusters. Table 2 gives out 
the error modes of orbit control thrusters in three axes, × refers to the error and ○ 
refers to the normal work. 
Table 2  
Error modes of orbit control thrusters in three axes. 
x-axis Orbit Control 
Thrusters 
d1 × ○ ○ ○ × × ○ ○ 
d2 ○ × ○ ○ ○ ○ × × 
d1~ ○ ○ × ○ × ○ ○ × 
d2~ ○ ○ ○ × ○ × × ○ 
y-axis Orbit Control 
Thrusters 
e1 × ○ ○ ○ × × ○ ○ 
e2 ○ × ○ ○ ○ ○ × × 
e1~ ○ ○ × ○ × ○ ○ × 
e2~ ○ ○ ○ × ○ × × ○ 
z-axis Orbit Control 
Thrusters 
f1 × ○ ○ ○ × × ○ ○ 
f2 ○ × ○ ○ ○ ○ × × 
f1~ ○ ○ × ○ × ○ ○ × 
f2~ ○ ○ ○ × ○ × × ○ 
The operational amount is given to represent for the control compensatory 
degree of astronauts to complete the mission which is an index to indicate the 
complexity, energy consumption, and risk degree of the mission [10]. The more fuels 
are consumed, the more operations should be executed. The operational amount is 
defined as the ratio of control pulse amounts to basic pulse amounts, which is 
expressed as 
 p
thrust
Pk
P
   (22) 
where Pthrust is the basic thruster amount, P refers to the actual pulse amounts. 
3.2 Single-axis fault analysis 
IS is utilized to simulate the handling controlled RVD along the designed 
trajectories for inspecting the operational strategy in different error modes. The 
simulation setting configuration and initial conditions are listed in Table 3. 
Table 3  
Simulation settings under fault conditions. 
Parameters Values 
Initial Relative Positions 100.038 , 0.0167 , 0.023x m y m z m      
Initial Relative Velocities 0.0076 , 0.131 , 0.0087vx m s vy m s vz m s      
Envelope Size 2.42 2.42 4m m m   
Orbit Control Thrust 60N  
Attitude Control Thrust 25N  
Basic Pulse Amount 3000 
Limitation of el and az ° °10 ~ 10  
Limitation of Attitude Angle ° °1 ~ 1  
Sensitive Factor 0.35 
Receding Horizon 3 
Step 1 
Simulation Time 1300s 
Fig. 6 shows the trajectories, attitudes and pulses under the nominal conditions. 
The pulse amounts in three axes are 164, 557, and 856, in which the forward pulse 
amounts are 114, 230, and 327 respectively.  
 
Fig. 6. Simulation results of nominal conditions. 
The motion in the y-axis is decoupled with the other axes. Comparing with the 
other axes, the decoupled motion is only affected by the thruster of the y-axis and the 
regulation of the fault effect is more obvious. Thus, the operational strategy of fault 
thrusters in the y-axis is mainly analyzed here. All the other cases will be listed at the 
end of this part. Fig. 7 shows the attitude and measurement angles in the y-axis. The 
single thruster fault occurs in thruster e1~，while the double thrusters faults occur in 
thruster e1 and thruster e1~. 
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Fig. 7. Simulation results in the case of y-axis thruster faults. (a) faults in thruster e1~ (b)faults in 
thruster e1 and e1~. 
The failure of e1~ can cause the disturbing positive moment in the z-axis and the 
reduction of the forward thrust in the y-axis. With the original configuration in Fig 5, 
the yaw will be increased by the positive disturbing moment and revised by the 
attitude controller. When t=800s, the motion in x-axis enters the index damping phase 
as shown in Fig. 7, and then the x-axis thrusters keep opening forward. Table 4 
indicates that the astronauts should increase the impulse compensation to overcome 
the effects of thruster failures. 
When thrusters e1 and e1~ break down, z-axis positive moment and decreasing 
forward thrust are caused by the forward thrust signal in the y-axis and vice versa. The 
opposite effects of positive and negative control signals can produce more 
symmetrical results, which can be seen in results of yaw and azimuth. Thus, when the 
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single thruster breaks down, one can consider shutting down a thruster in the opposite 
direction to produce the symmetrical effects. However, the compensatory effect of 
double thruster failures in the y-axis is more than that of single thruster failure, i.e. the 
physical workloads of the operator will definitely be increased.  
Fig. 8 shows the attitude and measurement angles in the y-axis. Fig. 8 (a) shows 
the results of shutting down in thrusters e2 and e1~, and Fig. 8 (b) shows the results of 
shutting down in thrusters e1 and e2~. The thrust magnitude of both directions in the 
y-axis reduces from 120 N to 60 N. 
  
(a)  (b)  
Fig. 8. Simulation results in the case of different side faults of y-axis thrusters. (a) faults in 
thruster e2 and e1~ (b) faults in thruster e1 and e2~. 
Fig. 8 indicates that when the different side of the thrusters in one axis break 
down, the opposite control signals can cause the disturbing moment in the same 
direction. Compared with the same side fault, the different side fault can lead to larger 
deviation of the attitude angle. When the spacecraft enters the index damping phase, 
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the coupling effects from x-axis will affect y-axis more severely. Figure. 8 (a) shows 
that the failures of e2 and e1~ can cause the coupling effects on the positive offset in 
the y-axis and azimuth decrease, while Figure. 8 (b) shows the failures of e1 and e2~ 
can cause the coupling effects on negative offset in y-axis and azimuth increase. The 
physical workloads of the same side and different side failures are equivalent. 
According to Eq. (22), the physical workloads and the operational amount of 
different error modes are calculated and listed in Table 4. 
Table 4  
Operational amount of the single-axis thruster fault. 
Fault 
Thruster 
x-axis y-axis z-axis 
Operational 
Amount 
+ - + - + -  
—— 114 50 230 327 289 567 0.53 
e1~ 114 50 464 328 292 568 0.61 
e2~ 114 50 459 326 289 565 0.60 
e1/e1~ 116 52 459 645 289 567 0.71 
e2/e1~ 115 51 458 647 290 568 0.71 
e1/e2~ 116 52 457 645 289 568 0.71 
f1 116 51 231 327 576 567 0.62 
f2~ 114 50 231 328 288 1131 0.71 
f1/f1~ 116 51 230 326 579 1088 0.80 
f2/f1~ 116 51 229 328 577 1088 0.81 
f1/f2~ 116 51 227 325 577 1089 0.80 
f2/f2~ 117 52 230 326 576 1088 0.80 
d1 230 49 228 325 290 567 0.56 
d1~ 123 104 231 326 288 564 0.55 
d1/d1~ 250 105 232 328 288 564 0.59 
d2/d1~ 251 106 228 323 288 563 0.59 
d1/d2~ 252 105 229 325 290 569 0.59 
The table indicates that the operational impulse amounts are nearly double the 
amounts of the basic impulse. In the nominal situation, the most pulses are in the 
z-axis, thus the astronauts require most compensatory operations when thrusters in the 
z-axis fail down. According to the definition of risk in Ref.35, the risk is herewith 
determined by the compensatory amount of the thruster failure, in other words, the 
larger physical workloads refer to the more severe faults. Thus, the degree of risks can 
be ranked from the minimum to maximum as: single x-axis fault, double x-axis faults, 
single y-axis fault, single z-axis fault, and double y-axis faults. Double z-axis faults 
are the most severe errors. Eq.(2) can also indicate that y-axis motions in the Hill 
coordinate system are decoupled with the other two axes, but the z-axis motions are 
effected by the gravity and motions in the x-axis. Thus, faults in z-axis thrusters are 
much more serious. 
3.3 Multi-axis fault analysis 
When there are errors in more than one axis, due to the limited attitude control 
abilities, the astronauts cannot promise the successful completion. In the original 
configuration, the x-axis and y-axis failures can both produce a disturbing z-axis 
moment, while the failure in z-axis can produce disturbing x-axis and y-axis moments. 
Thus, the coupling of multi-axis fault mainly refers to the failures of thrusters in 
x-axis and y-axis. 
Four multi-axis fault cases chosen from all the controllable fault circumstances 
are studied here. The shutting down thrusters are d1, d1~, e1, and e1~; d1, d2~, e1, and 
e2~; d2, d1~, e2, and e2~; d2, d2~, e2, and e1~. The simulation results of the four cases 
are shown below. 
 
Fig. 9. Simulation results of case 1. 
Fig. 9 shows the case with failures of thrusters d1, d1~, e1, and e1~. The azimuth 
appears to be diverging largely at the beginning, though the controller can eventually 
control the chaser to follow the expected trajectory. The deviation of the target would 
lead to the measurement failure if no other sensors were present. The main reason is at 
the start of the mission negative thrusters in y and x axes are required to open 
simultaneously. They produce the disturbing moments in the same direction during 
the period which cause the deviation of the azimuth. 
 
Fig. 10. Simulation results of case 2. 
The results of case 2 with the failures of thruster d1, d2~, e1, and e2~ are better 
than those in case 1. Faults in two axes will produce opposite disturbing moments, 
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thus the moments produced simultaneously can counteract each other. After 800 
seconds, the motion in the x-axis enters into the index damping phase and the 
thrusters keep opening negatively, which produces the positive disturbing moment to 
increase the azimuth and keep it positive. 
 
Fig. 11. Simulation results of case 3. 
Case 3 is the situation with the failures of thrusters d2, d1~, e2, and e2~, which is 
opposite of case 2. At first, the negative acceleration in y-axis can cause a positive 
disturbing moment opposite to the disturbing moment caused by x-axis thrusters. Thus, 
the azimuth would not exceed its limitations. After 800s, the continuously negative 
disturbing moment decreases the azimuth and keeps it below zero.  
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Fig. 12. Simulation results of case 4. 
Case 4 is the situation with the failures of thrusters d2, d2~, e2, and e1~. In the 
beginning, the negative acceleration in the y-axis can cause a positive disturbing 
moment in accordance with the disturbing moment from failures in the x-axis. As in 
case 1, the azimuth exceeds the limitation of the field of view. The mission would fail 
without other sensors to measure the relative states.  
The physical workloads of all the multi-axis faults are listed in Table 5 including 
four uncontrollable cases. 
Table 5 
Physical workloads of the multi-axis thruster faults. 
Faulty Thrusters x-axis y-axis z-axis Operational 
Rates x-axis y-axis + - + - + - 
—— —— 114 50 230 327 289 567 0.53 
d1/d1~ e1/e1~ 245 104 459 620 288 565 0.76 
d1/d1~ e1/e2~ 245 104 457 622 285 565 0.76 
d1/d1~ e2/e1~ 251 105 456 641 291 568 0.77 
d1/d1~ e2/e2~ 252 106 456 641 291 568 0.77 
d1/d2~ e1/e1~ 250 104 457 643 292 569 0.77 
d1/d2~ e1/e2~ 250 104 456 643 289 566 0.77 
d1/d2~ e2/e1~ —— —— —— —— —— —— —— 
d1/d2~ e2/e2~ —— —— —— —— —— —— —— 
d2/d1~ e2/e1~ 250 104 457 643 289 567 0.77 
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d2/d1~ e2/e2~ 250 104 458 643 289 567 0.77 
d2/d1~ e1/e1~ —— —— —— —— —— —— —— 
d2/d1~ e1/e2~ —— —— —— —— —— —— —— 
d2/d2~ e1/e1~ 250 104 455 640 290 567 0.77 
d2/d2~ e1/e2~ 250 104 460 645 289 566 0.76 
d2/d2~ e2/e1~ 251 104 457 611 293 575 0.76 
d2/d2~ e2/e2~ 254 107 456 611 292 574 0.76 
Table 5 indicates that the compensatory operations of multi-axis faults in each 
axis are equal to those in cases with the single-axis fault. The operational rate shows 
the physical workloads of controllable multiaxial faults are equivalent to those of 
faults in the z-axis. They have the same level of risk. When three or more thrusters 
break down in x and y axes, astronauts may not be able to achieve the mission 
smoothly and the RVD IS system becomes underactuated. 
4 Reconfiguration based on risk classification 
4.1 Risk classification analysis 
The risk could be basically divided into the controllable and uncontrollable risks. 
The controllable cases are further divided into small deviation and large deviation. 
The previous results of fault simulations in single-axis and multi-axis show that the 
case with the single-axis fault is controllable, while the case with multiaxial faults 
may be uncontrollable. If the effects caused by thruster faults can be considered 
during the design stage, the configuration can then be improved to mitigate against 
failures. Risk classification of different multi-axis thruster faults is listed in Table 6. 
Table 6  
Risk classification of different multi-axis thruster faults. 
Faulty 
Thrusters 
e1/e1~ 
Mz-/Mz+ 
e1/e2~  
Mz-/Mz- 
e2/e1~ 
Mz+/Mz+ 
e2/e2~ 
Mz+/Mz- 
d1/d1~  Mz+/Mz- II II I I 
d1/d2~  Mz+/Mz+ I I III III 
d2/d1~  Mz-/Mz- III III I I 
d2/d2~  Mz-/Mz+ I I II II 
The results of mission-oriented fault simulation show that the negative thrusters 
should be employed in both x and y axes at the beginning. Class I refers to the 
acceptable fault. Class II indicates that the same disturbing moments can cause a large 
deviation of the yaw and the azimuth. Class III indicates that the directions of 
disturbing moments caused by thruster faults in both directions in the x-axis are same 
as those of moments caused by y-axis thruster failure, the deviation can be even larger 
which directly leads to the uncontrollable results.  
4.2 Further reconfiguration design 
The risk degree shows that altitude control thrusters could not resist three or 
more disturbing moments in one direction Thus, the thruster configuration can be 
improved in two aspects. On one hand, to enhance the attitude controllability in the 
z-axis to resist the disturbance from the other axes, on the other hand, to reconfigure 
the thrusters to avoid the superposition of the moments. 
To verify the two schemes, the case with shutting down of thrusters d1, d2~, e2, 
and e1~ is chosen as the comparative simulation case. The fault simulation results of 
the original configuration are shown in Fig. 13. 
 
Fig. 13. Fault simulation results of the original configuration. 
Scheme I is to improve the control ability of attitude control thrusters from 25 N 
to 50 N. The results show the large deviation is narrowed into the limitations of the 
field of view. The whole process becomes controllable. 
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Fig. 14. Fault Simulation of Scheme I. 
Scheme II is to reconfigure the orbital control thrusters in the x-axis and y-axis.to 
produce the disturbing moments in different axes. 
Forward thrusters d1, d2 in the x-axis are reinstalled on the vertical x-o-z plane. 
Backward thrusters e1, e2 in the y-axis are reinstalled on the vertical y-o-z plane. The 
modified configuration is shown in Fig. 15. 
 
Fig. 15. Modified Configuration of Thrusters. 
After the reconfiguration, faults of positive thrusters in the x-axis can produce the 
y-axis disturbing moments, and faults of negative thrusters in the y-axis can produce 
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the z-axis disturbing moments. The x-axis and y-axis attitude control moments are 
larger than that of the z-axis. Thus, to adjust the thrusters undertaking most 
operational pulses in the positive x-axis and negative y-axis to produce the y-axis and 
x-axis disturbing moments respectively can decrease the disturbance in the z-axis. The 
simulation results of the comparative case are shown in Fig. 16.  
 
Fig. 16. Fault Simulation of Scheme II. 
Both schemes can guarantee the uncontrollable cases with original configuration 
against failure and become more robust. The maximum tolerant number of faulty 
thrusters reaches six which means the possibility of mission success under the thruster 
faults is improved. Comparing the results of the two schemes under the same fault 
conditions, the opening time of z-axis attitude control thrusters in Scheme II is found 
obviously less than that in Scheme I. It means the physical workload of Scheme II is 
less, and the scheme is much easier for the astronaut to grasp. Though the azimuth 
and yaw results of Scheme II within the limitation are little bigger than those with 
Scheme I, Scheme II cost much fewer fuels to complete the mission. This reflects the 
trad-off between fuels cost and the precisions. More fuels indicate the less room for 
effective load and astronauts may feel pressure in the faulty condition, so it is worthy 
to abandon some precisions to ease the operation and save the fuels under the faulty 
conditions. In conclusion, Scheme II is superior to Scheme I.  
5 Conclusions 
Few configuration designs considering the control effect under faulty conditions 
compare with those focused on the maximum achievement. However, the risk 
resistance ability is a critical factor for the high risk and high investment projects like 
manned space missions. Thus, given the unique advantages of inverse simulation in 
man-in-loop fault simulation，a manually controlled rendezvous and docking inverse 
simulation system was established to explore a new way to improve the control effect 
of original configuration under the faulty conditions. 
The operational amount was firstly defined to reflect the operation of the 
astronauts, and based on which the operational strategy and risk grades under 
single-axis and multi-axis fault situations through inverse simulation were studied. 
The rank of risk degree was given out and the physical workloads of controllable 
multiaxial faults were equivalent to those of the most severe single-axis fault cases 
with double z-axis faults. The uncontrollable case was actually caused by the 
disturbing moments from fault thrusters in the other axes, so the configuration should 
be well-distributed to avoid disturbances in the same axis or the control thrust of the 
most influenced axis should be improved. Based on the conclusion, two modified 
schemes were provided and verified. Both schemes can guarantee the uncontrollable 
cases against failure and maximize a tolerant number of faulty thrusters, trading off 
fuels cost and the precisions Scheme II is superior. 
The successful implementation of fault analysis and reconfiguration indicates 
that inverse simulation can be utilized as a general tool for fault analysis and 
reconfiguration of the manually controlled systems. 
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Appendix A. Attitude Control Scheme 
The attitude is controlled by the automatic control strategy. The method is 
illustrated as below. 
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Fig. 1. Diagram of phase plane control. 
The attitude state is divided into several switching areas by the switching lines. 
The switching lines are expressed as 
Negative Opening Line DE：  2 02 ( )a d     
Negative Closing Line BC：  2 02 ( )a d      
Positive Opening Line ' 'D E ： 2 02 ( )a d    
Positive Closing Line ' 'B C ： 2 02 ( )a d       
where a0 is determined by the moment of the attitude control thrusters; d,  are 
determined by the control precisions of attitude angles and angular velocities 
separately. The border parameters of the switching lines are ̇௦  and ̇௟ . The 
opening time parameters are set as btc1, btc2, and btc3. These parameters are related 
with the control ability of the thrusters. The details of the phase plane strategy are 
listed in Table 1. 
Table 1  
Attitude phase plane control strategy. 
No. Control Area Description Opening Time Instruction 
1 R11/R21 
Thruster Full Opening 
De-/Accelerate Area 3
T btc T   
T is the sampling 
period. 1 2 3, ,btc btc btc
adjust the opening 
time of the control 
thrusters. 
2 R12/R22 
Thruster Step Control 
Area 2
T btc T   
3 R13/R23 
Thruster Step Control 
De-/Accelerate Area 2
T btc T   
4 R0 Thruster Closing Area 1T btc T   
 
Appendix B. Thruster Active Model 
The spacecraft actuators used to execute the attitude and orbit control are 
generally relay-type thrusters. This kind of thruster has fixed amplitude thrust with 
changeable working time. Pulse thrust and continuous thrust can both be equivalent to 
the variable opening time of the relay-type thrusters. Thus, the continuous thrusts 
should be discretized by the pulse width and pulse frequency (PWPF) [39]. Based on 
the theorem of impulse, PW can be expressed as 
 *maxm v u u       (1) 
where m is the mass of the propellant, umax refers to the maximum thrust, u* refers to 
the outputs of IS,  refers to the opening time in one step . The whole process in T 
duration is explained in Fig. 1 and can be expressed as 
 1 2 1
0
... ( )
T
total N Nm v m v m v m v m v m a t dt             (2) 
*
1nu 
*
0u
*
1u
*
2u
*
2nu 
maxu
 
Fig. 1. PWPF of fixed amplitude thrust. 
When the opening time  is less than a certain value, the required correction is 
small which means the system cannot perceive this small error between the current 
state and expected state and no operations happen. Using the sensitivity factor, the 
discrete process can represent the physical meaning naturally, which is given by 
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 (4) 
where kt refers to time sensitivity factor and kf refers to acceleration sensitivity factor. 
Both factors represent for the sensitivity degree of the system to the offsets. 
According to Eq. (1), the sensitivity factor of the system should be k = min [kt, kf ]. 
The discrete results of IS can then be attained through Eq.(1) to Eq.(4). 
 The sensitivity factor represents the sensitivity degree of RVD IS system to the 
offsets between the desired and current states. The system with a smaller factor can 
react more quickly to the offset, the bigger factor on the contrary means less 
sensitivity. A manually controlled system has the same characteristics, i.e. the more 
sensitive the operators are, the stronger the perception ability of the system will be. 
The regulations both have some similarities, thus, the factors can also seem as the 
reflection of the operator’s sensitivity regarding the results.  
 
